道德情操论,英文,读后感亚当·斯密的道德情操论,有关同情的那一章,简介或者读后感,不需要很多的,最好是英文的。。。。Part,I,,Sectio...
道德情操论 英文 读后感
亚当·斯密的道德情操论,有关同情的那一章,简介或者读后感,不需要很多的,最好是英文的。。。。Part I, Section I, Chapter I: Of Sympathy
According to Smith humans have a natural tendency to care about the well-being of others for no other reason than the pleasure one gets from seeing them happy. He calls this sympathy, defining it "our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever" (p. 5). He argues that this occurs under either of two conditions:
We see firsthand the fortune or misfortune of another person
The fortune or misfortune is vividly depicted to us
Although this is apparently true, he follows to argue that this tendency lies even in "the greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society" (p. 2).
Smith also proposes several variables that can moderate the extent of sympathy, noting that the situation that is the cause of the passion is the large determinant of our response:
The vividness of the account of the condition of another person
An important point put forth by Smith is that the degree to which we sympathize, or "tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels", is proportional to the degree of vividness in our observation or the description of the event.
Knowledge of the causes of the emotions
When observing the anger of another person, for example, we are unlikely to sympathize with this person because we "are unacquainted with his provocation" and as a result cannot imagine what it is like to feel what he feels. Further, since we can see the "fear and resentment" of those who are the targets of the person's anger we are likely to sympathize and take side with them. Thus, sympathetic responses are often conditional on or their magnitude is determined by the causes of the emotion in the person being sympathized with.
Whether other people are involved in the emotion
Specifically, emotions such as joy and grief tell us about the "good or bad fortune" of the person we are observing them in, whereas anger tells us about the bad fortune with respect to another person. It is the difference between intrapersonal emotions, such as joy and grief, and interpersonal emotions, such as anger, that causes the difference in sympathy, according to Smith. That is, intrapersonal emotions trigger at least some sympathy without the need for context whereas interpersonal emotions are dependent on context.
He also proposes a natural 'motor' response to seeing the actions of others: If we see a knife hacking off a person's leg we wince away, if we see someone dance we move in the same ways, we feel the injuries of others as if we had them ourselves.
Smith makes clear that we sympathize not only with the misery of others but also the joy; he states that observing an emotional state through the "looks and gestures" in another person is enough to initiate that emotional state in ourselves. Furthermore, we are generally insensitive to the real situation of the other person; we are instead sensitive to how we would feel ourselves if we were in the situation of the other person. For example, a mother with a suffering baby feels "the most complete image of misery and distress" while the child merely feels "the uneasiness of the present instant" (p. 8).
According to Smith humans have a natural tendency to care about the well-being of others for no other reason than the pleasure one gets from seeing them happy. He calls this sympathy, defining it "our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever" (p. 5). He argues that this occurs under either of two conditions:
We see firsthand the fortune or misfortune of another person
The fortune or misfortune is vividly depicted to us
Although this is apparently true, he follows to argue that this tendency lies even in "the greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society" (p. 2).
Smith also proposes several variables that can moderate the extent of sympathy, noting that the situation that is the cause of the passion is the large determinant of our response:
The vividness of the account of the condition of another person
An important point put forth by Smith is that the degree to which we sympathize, or "tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels", is proportional to the degree of vividness in our observation or the description of the event.
Knowledge of the causes of the emotions
When observing the anger of another person, for example, we are unlikely to sympathize with this person because we "are unacquainted with his provocation" and as a result cannot imagine what it is like to feel what he feels. Further, since we can see the "fear and resentment" of those who are the targets of the person's anger we are likely to sympathize and take side with them. Thus, sympathetic responses are often conditional on or their magnitude is determined by the causes of the emotion in the person being sympathized with.
Whether other people are involved in the emotion
Specifically, emotions such as joy and grief tell us about the "good or bad fortune" of the person we are observing them in, whereas anger tells us about the bad fortune with respect to another person. It is the difference between intrapersonal emotions, such as joy and grief, and interpersonal emotions, such as anger, that causes the difference in sympathy, according to Smith. That is, intrapersonal emotions trigger at least some sympathy without the need for context whereas interpersonal emotions are dependent on context.
He also proposes a natural 'motor' response to seeing the actions of others: If we see a knife hacking off a person's leg we wince away, if we see someone dance we move in the same ways, we feel the injuries of others as if we had them ourselves.
Smith makes clear that we sympathize not only with the misery of others but also the joy; he states that observing an emotional state through the "looks and gestures" in another person is enough to initiate that emotional state in ourselves. Furthermore, we are generally insensitive to the real situation of the other person; we are instead sensitive to how we would feel ourselves if we were in the situation of the other person. For example, a mother with a suffering baby feels "the most complete image of misery and distress" while the child merely feels "the uneasiness of the present instant" (p. 8).
求《道德情操论》读后感
希望大家发表一下读完《道德情操论》的感想,非常感激。。。不读则已,读过之后,我陷入了深深地沉思之中:改革开放30年来我国经济实现了飞跃式发展,人民生活水平显著提高,现在正向着殷实富足的全面小康社会大步前进。
不可否认,30年的成就足以让许多人感到惊喜和自豪!但是,我却从中看到了诸多隐患和不安,心里不禁为祖国的未来而担忧。社会发展到现在,中国人将自私和贪婪发挥到了极致,社会生活中大量充斥着贫富差距过大、医疗教育腐败、贪污受贿成风,等等,近期的三鹿奶粉事件、糖脂宁胶囊假药案,何不都是由此而生?
《道德情操论》中有这样一段话写的很精彩也很现实:如果一个社会的经济发展成果不能真正的分流到民众手中,那么它在道义上是不得人心的,也是存在风险的,最终将会威胁到社会的稳定!
然而,我们在充分学习领略了《国富论》的精髓,在社会主义市场经济大繁荣的同时却忽略了学习更为重要的《道德情操论》,导致各种威胁社会稳定和谐的事件三番五次的出现。时至今日以总理为首的我们才恍然大悟,原来是这样!这就象许多武侠故事里的情节一样,某某人修炼绝世神功,可无论怎么努力都无法突破最后一层!其实道理很简单,往往离最后成功最近的一个阶段,需要的反而是你的宽容与慈悲。也只有领悟到这一点你才能真正的修成正果!可惜的是,我们当时由于急功近力、心浮气躁,始终没能成功!
联想到我们的国家,不正是故事里急于求成的修炼者吗?只顾追求经济的高速发展而忽略了发展过程中的与民互动,发展的成果仅仅只是少数人享有,绝大多数老百姓都没有普惠到!借温总理的多次提及,盼请当局政府能认真的读一读《道德情操论》,重新审视一下当前我们的基本国情,去思索探讨我国未来的发展之路!
亡羊补牢,为时不晚!
不可否认,30年的成就足以让许多人感到惊喜和自豪!但是,我却从中看到了诸多隐患和不安,心里不禁为祖国的未来而担忧。社会发展到现在,中国人将自私和贪婪发挥到了极致,社会生活中大量充斥着贫富差距过大、医疗教育腐败、贪污受贿成风,等等,近期的三鹿奶粉事件、糖脂宁胶囊假药案,何不都是由此而生?
《道德情操论》中有这样一段话写的很精彩也很现实:如果一个社会的经济发展成果不能真正的分流到民众手中,那么它在道义上是不得人心的,也是存在风险的,最终将会威胁到社会的稳定!
然而,我们在充分学习领略了《国富论》的精髓,在社会主义市场经济大繁荣的同时却忽略了学习更为重要的《道德情操论》,导致各种威胁社会稳定和谐的事件三番五次的出现。时至今日以总理为首的我们才恍然大悟,原来是这样!这就象许多武侠故事里的情节一样,某某人修炼绝世神功,可无论怎么努力都无法突破最后一层!其实道理很简单,往往离最后成功最近的一个阶段,需要的反而是你的宽容与慈悲。也只有领悟到这一点你才能真正的修成正果!可惜的是,我们当时由于急功近力、心浮气躁,始终没能成功!
联想到我们的国家,不正是故事里急于求成的修炼者吗?只顾追求经济的高速发展而忽略了发展过程中的与民互动,发展的成果仅仅只是少数人享有,绝大多数老百姓都没有普惠到!借温总理的多次提及,盼请当局政府能认真的读一读《道德情操论》,重新审视一下当前我们的基本国情,去思索探讨我国未来的发展之路!
亡羊补牢,为时不晚!
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